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Abstract—We investigate bandwidth allocation and scheduling
in non-cooperative wireless networks as a mixed integer pro-
gramming problem. Fast Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction-
based bandwidth allocation (FABA), incorporating relaxation-
based greedy algorithm (RGA) and split-flow-based algorithm
(SFA), is proposed by modifying the traditional VCG auction
to make it computationally feasible. With incentives provided
by FABA, the dominant strategy of any selfish node in the
network is to be cooperative so that the system cost is minimized.
We implement FABA via a batching-based mechanism which
allocates bandwidth for all call routing requests arriving in a
certain batching period simultaneously. Our simulation evaluates
the performance in terms of system cost, payment-cost ratio, and
setup time.
Index Terms—Auction-Based Routing, Bandwidth Allocation,
Scheduling, Non-cooperative Wireless Network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Some networks, such as ad hoc networks, inter-domain
networks, and cellular networks, consist of devices owned by
different individual users [1], [4], [10]. Due to the limited
communication resources (e.g., energy or bandwidth), these
users may only be interested in maximizing their own utilities,
and not willing to forward data packets for others. Such
networks are called non-cooperative networks. The network
performance and availability may be adversely affected by the
non-cooperative users [5].
Credit/payment is an incentive for selfish nodes to cooperate
[9]. In [9], a cheating detection system is developed based on
a statistical analysis of the payment information in activity
reports to prevent cheating in multi-hop wireless networks.
In [17], the receivers monitor whether intermediate nodes
are cooperative to relay the flows, and report to a credit
center, which makes the payments to the intermediate nodes.
A charging policy is proposed for multihop cellular networks
in [10], in which payments are secured via a low-overhead
implementation of payment checks.
Transmission payment determination is a critical issue in
a monetary transfer system. The bandwidth allocation and
pricing in an overlay network with respect to one-hop flows is
studied in [13]. Xi et al. studied a pricing game in which nodes
price their services selfishly and strategically in multihop
networks [16]. However, strategy-proofness is not guaranteed
in their schemes. An optimal scheme for multipath traffic as-
signment (OSMA) was proposed in [14] to handle the routing
requests sequentially in the order of their arrivals. A more
general analytical model was proposed in [17] with a strategy-
proof scheme for multiple requests. Unfortunately, these work
cannot handle the bandwidth allocation and scheduling for
multi-hop routing in non-cooperative wireless network, since
the interferences among wireless nodes are not considered.
The available transmission bandwidth of every link is as-
sumed to be given and fixed in most work [14], [15], [16].
In fact, the transmission bandwidth available for each link
in a wireless network depends on how the communication
resources, such as time slots in time-division duplexing (TDD)
system and frequency channels in frequency-division duplex-
ing (FDD) system, are shared. In this work, we study the
joint auction-based bandwidth allocation and scheduling in
noncooperative wireless networks.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, an analytical model for bandwidth alloca-
tion and scheduling in non-cooperative wireless networks is
proposed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work considering bandwidth allocation and scheduling in
non-cooperative wireless networks. Referring to the analogy
between the bandwidth allocation problem (BAP) and the
procurement problem in economics, BAP is formulated as a
mixed integer programming (MIP) problem. Since BAP is NP-
hard, the traditional VCG auction is computationally infeasible
[11]. We have proposed a computationally feasible scheme,
fast VCG auction-based bandwidth allocation (FABA), to allo-
cate bandwidth and to determine the corresponding payments.
FABA can also guarantee strategy-proofness and system cost
efficiency. FABA is implemented with a batching mechanism
which allocates bandwidth and determines prices of resources
for all routing requests arriving in a batching period simulta-
neously.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we model the problem of bandwidth allocation and scheduling
in non-cooperative wireless networks. We present and analyze
FABA in Section III. Section IV discusses simulation results.
Section V concludes with possible extensions of our work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Assume that there is a directed wireless network G =
(V,E). V = {v0, v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of n + 1 nodes
in which v0 is the access point (AP) connected to the wired
network (or Internet) and the remaining n nodes are non-
AP nodes. Node u ∈ V can communicate to any node
v ∈ Nu within the transmission range ru of Node u,
i.e., Nu = {v ∈ V \ {u}| ‖ v − u ‖ ≤ ru} [12]. E
out
u =
{(u, v)|v ∈ Nu} is the set of outgoing links originated from
Node u. Einu = {(w, u)|u ∈ Nw, w ∈ V \ {u}} is the set of
incoming links terminated at Node u. Denote the maximum
achievable data transmission rate on Link (u, v) as Cuv , which
quantifies the capacity of Link (u, v) if the wireless radio is
dedicated only to transmissions from Node u to Node v.
We adopt the Interference Range Model [8] for modelling
wireless channel interferences. The emission of Node u in-
terferes with data reception of Node v ∈ Iu, where Iu
is the set of nodes within the interference range Ru of
Node u, i.e., Iu = {v ∈ V \ {u}| ‖ v − u ‖ ≤ Ru}. Link
(u, v) is said to be interfered by Link (w, e), if the receiver
of Link (u, v) is situated within the interference range of
the sender of Link (w, e), namely, v ∈ Iw. Let Luv =
{(w, e) ∈ E|v ∈ Iw, w ∈ V \ {u}} be the link interference set
of Link (u, v), i.e., data transmissions on the links in Luv
would interfere with the transmissions on Link (u, v).
A set of M senders is represented as S = {s1, s2, . . . , sM}.
These senders request bandwidth to communicate with the AP
in the form of a bandwidth requirement vector b = (bs|s ∈
S). Each Link (u, v) ∈ Eoutu originated from Node u has
a marginal cost function fuv(x), which is private and only
known to Node u. fuv(x) is an increasing function, which
represents the cost of forwarding one additional unit of traffic
when x units of bandwidth have been used. Indeed, the higher
the traffic load on a link, the longer the queueing delay, and
the higher the packet dropping probability. Thus, the cost for
Node u to forward a flow occupying yuv units of bandwidth on
Link (u, v) is a convex function cuv(yuv) =
∫ yuv
0
fuv(x)dx.
Assume that all nodes in the network are non-cooperative.
Node u reports fˆu = (fˆuv(x)|v ∈ Nu) instead of fu =
(fuv(x)|v ∈ Nu). Here, Node u cheats when fu 6= fˆu. The
source node of an SD pair must pay for the intermediate
nodes to carry its flows, and this payment must at least cover
the forwarding costs of the intermediate nodes. Let pu be the
total revenue received by Node u in forwarding traffic for other
nodes when the allocated bandwidth on its outgoing links in
Eoutu is yu = (yuv|v ∈ Nu). Let cu(yu) =
∑
v∈Nu
cuv(yuv)
be the total cost of Node u. A non-cooperative intermediate
node u in the network aims to maximize its utility, Uu, where
Uu = pu − cu(yu) (1)
III. FAST VCG AUCTION-BASED BANDWIDTH
ALLOCATION (FABA)
We formulate BAP for finding the feasible bandwidth allo-
cation and scheduling as a mixed integer program (MIP). AP
collects the routing requests in a batching period T ·∆T , where
T is the number of time slots in a batching period and ∆T is
the duration of a time slot. The routing requests are scheduled
simultaneously at the end of the batching period. Unsatisfied
requests due to lack of bandwidths are postponed to the next
batching period. Then, FABA is developed to determine the
payment to stimulate selfish nodes to relay flows of others
so that the system cost is minimized according to truthfully
reported information.
A. Bandwidth Allocation
The notation Transmission Mode (TM) [12] is employed to
demonstrate the transmission states of links. Each state of a
link in a TM indicates whether data can be transmitted on it.
Let the state of Link (u, v) in TM γi be denoted by γi,uv. If
the link (u, v) ∈ E is utilized, γi,uv = 1; otherwise, γi,uv = 0.
A TM γi = (γi,uv|(u, v) ∈ E) is said to be feasible if and
only if γi satisfies the following conditions:
∀γi,uv, if γi,uv = 1,
∑
(w,e)∈Luv∪Eoutu ∪E
out
v
γi,we = 1 (2)
With a feasible transmission mode (FTM), data can be
transmitted on the employed links simultaneously without
any interferences. These O FTMs consist of the feasible
transmission mode set Γ, where O is the number of FTMs.
Assume that routing requests require cumulative band-
width b = (bs|s ∈ S) in a certain batching period. Let
yu = (yuv|(u, v) ∈ E
out
u ) be the occupied bandwidth on the
outgoing links of Node u. If one time slot is allocated to Link
(u, v), CuvT units of bandwidth are available on Link (u, v). Let
hi be the number of time slots assigned to FTM γi. The total
number of time slots allocated to Link (u, v) is
∑O
i=1 hiγi,uv .
Thus, total available bandwidth is CuvT
∑O
i=1 hiγi,uv . BAP can
be formulated as a mixed integer program (MIP) to minimize
the total system cost as follows:
min W =
∑
u∈V
cˆu(yu) (3)
s.t.
∑
(s,v)∈Eouts
ysv −
∑
(w,s)∈Eins
yws = bs, ∀s ∈ S (4)
∑
(u,v)∈Eoutu
yuv −
∑
(w,u)∈Einu
ywu = 0, ∀u ∈ V \ {S ∪ {v0}}
(5)
yuv ≤
Cuv
T
O∑
i=1
hiγi,uv, ∀(u, v) ∈ E (6)
O∑
i=1
hi ≤ T (7)
0 ≤ hi ≤ T, hi ∈ Z (i = 1, 2, . . . , O) (8)
yuv ≥ 0 ((u, v) ∈ E) (9)
In BAP, Constraint (4) ensures that the difference between
the total outgoing flow and incoming flow equals the required
bandwidth so that the bandwidth requirement of Sender s
is satisfied. Constraint (5) ensures the flow balance at the
intermediate nodes such that all data packets will be forwarded
by intermediate nodes. Constraint (6) is the capacity constraint.
Constraint (7) is the time slot constraint.
B. Relaxation-Based Greedy Approximation
BAP is a mixed integer program, which is an NP-hard
problem [3]. We propose RGA to solve BAP. The relaxation of
BAP (RBAP) is the problem obtained by replacing the integer
constraints of hi ∈ Z (i = 1, 2, . . . , O) in BAP by constraints
hi ∈ R (i = 1, 2, . . . , O), where R is the set of real numbers.
Then, RBAP is a convex optimization problem, which can
be solved via the interior-point algorithm in polynomial time.
Assume that (yr,hr) is the optimal solution to RBAP, where
hr = (hri |i = 1, . . . , O) is the time slot allocation vector.
The following relaxation-based greedy algorithm (RGA) is
developed to obtain the solution (ya,ha) to BAP.
Algorithm 1: Relaxation-based greedy algorithm (RGA)
Input: FTMs γi ∈ Γ, network graph G, bandwidth request b
Output: The approximate solution (ya,ha) to BAP
1 begin
2 Compute optimal solution (yr,hr) to RBAP;
3 ya ← yr;
4 hai ← bh
r
i c (i = 1, 2, . . . , O), where bh
r
i c is the integer
part of hri ;
5 guv ← max (y
a
uv − Cuv
∑O
i=1
hai γi,uv
T
, 0), ∀(u, v) ∈ E;
6 while
∑
(u,v)∈E guv > 0 do
7 if
∑O
i=1 h
a
i ≤ T then
8 ψi ←
∑
(u,v)∈E Φ(guv)
Cuvγi,uv
T
, where
Φ(guv) = 0, if guv = 0; Φ(guv) = 1, otherwise;
9 i∗ ← argmax{ψi|i = 1, 2, . . . , O};
10 guv ← max(guv −
Cuvγi∗,uv
T
, 0);
11 hai∗ ← h
a
i∗ + 1;
12 else
13 Network cannot support the request;
14 STOP;
15 end
16 end
17 end
Intuitively, RGA uses the bandwidth allocation result ya
as the target allocation to adjust the time slot assignment
vector ha = (hai |i = 1, . . . , O) to satisfy Constraints (6)-
(8) in BAP. Line 4 in Algorithm 1 removes the decimal
part of the elements of ha so that any hai is an integer and∑O
i=1 h
a
i =
∑O
i=1bh
r
i c ≤
∑O
i=1 h
r
i ≤ T satisfies Constraints
(7)-(8) in BAP. In Line 5, {guv|(u, v) ∈ E} indicates the
rate gaps between the target bandwidth ya and the available
bandwidth with the current time slot assignment vector ha.
From Line 6 to Line 16, RGA iteratively assigns the remaining
time slots one by one to FTMs to increase the available
bandwidth until the rate gaps guv (∀(u, v) ∈ E) are reduced
to zero. In each iteration, the time slot is greedily assigned to
an FTM so that the total reduced rate gap is maximized (Line
9).
Theorem 1: Any feasible solution found by RGA is a global
optimal for BAP.
Proof: According to Algorithm 1,
∑O
i=1 h
a
i ≤ T and g =
(guv|(u, v) ∈ E) = 0. That is, for each Link (u, v), guv =
max(yauv − Cuv
∑O
i=1
hai γi,uv
0 , 0) = 0. Thus,
yauv ≤ Cuv
O∑
i=1
hai γi,uv
T
(10)
As a result, (ya,ha) is a feasible solution to both RBAP
and BAP. For any other feasible solution (y′,h′) to BAP,
W ′ =
∑
u∈V cˆu(y
′
u) ≥ W
r =
∑
u∈V cˆu(y
r
u) = W
a =∑
u∈V cˆu(y
a
u). Therefore, y
a is the optimal solution to BAP.
From Theorem 1, the feasible solution found by RGA in
polynomial time is globally optimal. However, RGA may not
find a feasible solution while a feasible solution to BAP exists.
The price to lower the computational complexity in RGA is
that some feasible solutions may be missed.
C. FVCG-Based Pricing Scheme
Revenues will be received by those nodes who participate
in data forwarding. A pricing scheme of FABA is proposed
to reduce the computational complexity. The total revenue
received in FABA by Node u is pu, which is
pu =W
′
−u −W
a + cˆu(y
a
u) (11)
where yau is the bandwidth allocation of Node u computed by
RGA, W a is the optimal system cost calculated in RGA, and
W ′−u is the system cost of BAP without Node u computed
by any approximate algorithm. Thus, the unit price of the
bandwidth in Node u is qu =
pu∑
(u,v)∈Eoutu
yauv
.
The following theorem shows that, with this payment
scheme, each selfish node will report its truthful information
to AP in order to maximize its utility, i.e., cˆu = cu, where
cˆu = (cuv|v ∈ Nu).
Theorem 2: If FABA is used, truthful reporting is the
dominant strategy for each node, irrespective of the bids of
other nodes.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary Node u, fix the set of bids of
cost functions for the other nodes as cˆ−u = {cˆv|v ∈ V \ {u}}.
If Node u reports its true information, i.e., cˆu = cu, the utility
of Node u is:
Uu = pu − cu(y
a
u)
=W ′−u −W
a
≥W ∗−u −W
∗ ≥ 0 (12)
where W ∗ = W a is the minimal system cost of BAP
according to Theorem 1 and W ∗−u is the minimal system cost
of BAP without Node u.
Let y′ be the bandwidth allocation vector with respect to
(cˆ−u, cˆu|u ∈ V ), where cˆu 6= cu. The utility of Node u is:
U ′u = pu − cu(y
′
u)
=W ′−u − (
∑
v∈V
v 6=u
cˆv(y
′
v) + cˆu(y
′
u)) + cˆu(y
′
u)− cu(y
′
u)
=W ′−u −
∑
v∈V
v 6=u
cˆv(y
′
v)− cu(y
′
u) (13)
Since y′ is not an optimal allocation with respect to the set
of the reported costs (cˆ−u, cu|u ∈ V ),
∑
v∈V,v 6=u cˆv(y
′
v) +
cu(y
′
u) ≥ W
∗. Thus, 0 ≤ U ′u ≤ Uu, and truthful reporting
always maximizes the bidder’s utility. As a result, reporting
true information is the dominant strategy.
From Theorem 2, FABA has the property of incentive
compatibility (IC). Since Uu ≥ 0 for all selfish nodes,
participations result in a non-negative utility. Thus, FABA
possesses individual rationality (IR). FABA is strategy-proof,
because FABA has both properties of IC and IR.
D. Split-Flow-Based Algorithm (SFA)
Although RBAP in RGA can be solved in polynomial time,
payment determination in (11) still requires a terribly long time
to compute W ′−u, ∀u ∈ V using RGA [17]. SFA is developed
to make it computationally feasible to compute W ′−u, ∀u ∈ V .
Let Pi = {P
1
i , . . . , P
Ki
i } be the available path set con-
necting sender si and AP, where Ki is the number of paths
in Pi. Denote bandwidth allocation among Pi as x
∗
i =
(x∗ik|k = 1, . . . ,Ki). Each path consists of several links. Let
θuvik = 1, if (u, v) ∈ P
k
i . Otherwise, θ
uv
ik = 0. Thus, given
the currently allocated bandwidth vector x∗ = (x∗i |si ∈ S),
the additional cost for assigning δ units of traffic to path P ki
is cki (δ,x
∗) =
∑
(u,v)∈Pk
i
(cuv(y
∗
uv + δ) − cuv(y
∗
uv)), where
y∗uv =
∑
si∈S
∑Ki
k=1 θ
uv
ik x
∗
ik is the aggregated flow rate on
Link (u, v). Furthermore, given the time slot assignment vector
h∗, the available bandwidth on Link (u, v) is
Cauv =
Cuv
T
O∑
i=1
h∗i γi,uv − y
∗
uv (14)
Therefore, the available bandwidth on Path P ki is C
max
ik =
min(u,v)∈Pk
i
Cauv .
In SFA, bandwidth requirements from different senders are
split into small pieces whose sizes are capped at δ. These
pieces are assigned to the least-cost paths one after another
sequentially until all bandwidth requirements are met. The
algorithm contains two adjustment processes, namely, produc-
tion adjustment and consumption adjustment. In production
adjustment, the algorithm assigns the time slot to FTMs in Γ
to increase the available bandwidth in the least-cost paths of
different senders so that the pieces of bandwidth can be dis-
tributed to these least-cost paths. In consumption adjustment,
the pieces of bandwidth requirements from unmet senders
are assigned to the least-cost path so that the system cost
is minimized. These two adjustment processes are alternately
executed to assign time slots and distribute bandwidth.
In Algorithm 2, Line 2 initializes the active sender set SA
which contains the senders with unmet bandwidth require-
ments. From Line 4 to Line 28, SFA iteratively allocates the
time slots to different links that are out of available bandwidth,
and the split traffic demands, capped at δ, of different senders
are assigned to the least-cost paths one after another. The
Algorithm 2: Split-Flow-Based Algorithm (SFA)
Input: Available path set P = {Pi|si ∈ S}, cost functions
cˆ = (cuv(x)|(u, v) ∈ E), and bandwidth requirements
b = (bs|s ∈ S).
Output: Bandwidth allocation x∗ among path set P and
scheduling vector h∗.
1 begin
2 Initialize: SA ← S;
3 x∗ ← 0 and h∗ ← 0, where 0 is a zero vector;
4 while SA 6= ∅ do
5 ω = (ωuv|(u, v) ∈ E)← 0;
6 ν = (Cauv|(u, v) ∈ E);
7 for each si ∈ SA do
8 P t = argminPk
i
∈Pi
cki (δ,x
∗);
9 for each Link (u, v) on Path Pt do
10 ωuv = ωuv + δ;
11 end
12 end
13 ω ← max{0, ω − ν};
14 while
∑
(u,v)∈E ωuv 6= 0 do
15 i∗ =
argmaxγi∈Γ
∑
(u,v)∈E max{0, ωuv−γi,uv
Cuv
T
};
16 hi∗ ← hi∗ + 1;
17 ωuv ← max{0, ωuv − γi∗,uv
Cuv
T
};
18 end
19 for each si ∈ SA do
20 P li = argminPk
i
cki (δl,x
∗), where
δil = min{bi, δ, C
max
il };
21 x∗il ← x
∗
il + δil;
22 bi ← bi − δl;
23 if bi = 0 then
24 Remove si from SA;
25 end
26 end
27 end
28 end
process is repeated until all requests are satisfied, i.e., SA = ∅.
Lines 5-18 are for the production adjustment. Line 5 initializes
the variable ω for predicting the bandwidth requirement on
links for the following bandwidth allocation. Line 6 initializes
the variable ν which denotes the current available bandwidth.
For each unsatisfied sender in SA, the split bandwidth is
assigned to the least-cost paths in Line 8 so that the required
bandwidth ωuv for the next bandwidth allocation are deter-
mined. Line 13 computes the bandwidth shortage which is
the difference between the bandwidth requirement and the
available bandwidth on all links. Lines 14-18 iteratively assign
time slots one by one to FTMs until the bandwidth shortages
are reduced to zero. At each step, the time slot is assigned
to an FTM in Γ which can maximally reduce the bandwidth
shortage in Line 15. After the production adjustment process,
the bandwidth pieces from senders in SA are distributed in
turns from Line 19 to Line 26 (consumption adjustment). In
particular, Lines 20-22 assign pieces of bandwidth to the least-
cost path for each sender in SA. If the bandwidth requirement
of a sender is satisfied, the sender is removed from SA.
A total of O( 1δ ) times are required for the while-loop from
Line 4 to Line 28. In each while-loop, there are three for-loops.
The time complexities of these three for-loops are O(M),
O(MO), and O(M), respectively, where M is the number
of senders and O is the number of FTMs in Γ. As a result,
the time complexity of SFA is O(MOδ ).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate FABA-20, FABA-220, and FABA-420, where
FABA-δ is the FABA using parameter δ Kbps in SFA. FABA
is implemented via a batching mechanism [17]. In particular,
AP acting as the control center allocates the bandwidth and
determines the payments for all routing requests of calls at
the end of each batching period. The duration of a batching
period BP has three different configurations, namely, 3, 7, and
11 seconds. The convex optimization solver used in RGA is
the Interior Point OPTimizer (Ipopt). We use dynamic source
routing (DSR) as the routing discovery protocol.
The routing schemes are evaluated via a simulation program
in C++. We simulate a random wireless network with node
density 100 nodes/km2 in a 400 metres by 400 metres area.
The access point is deployed at the centre of the area.
Following the IEEE 802.11 standards, the time slot length is
selected as 20 µs. Each node has a fixed transmission range
of 140 metres and interference range of 280 metres [12]. The
maximum transmission rate of each node is set to be C = 54
Mbps. Three convex link cost functions, namely, x, x2, and
ex/C , where x is the occupied bandwidth, are considered in
the simulation.
For a routing request, the sender is randomly selected from
the network. The duration time follows a general pareto distri-
bution with shape parameter 0.78 and scale parameter 31 [2].
The bandwidth requirement follows a lognormal distribution
whose mean is 175 Kbps [7]. The interarrival time between
two successive requests follows the exponential distribution
with arrival rate λ which can be 80, 90, 100, 110, and 120 (in
min−1).
The algorithms are compared via the following metrics:
1) System cost: The sum of costs measured by virtual
money at the participant nodes to meet routing requests
in a batching period is called the system cost.
2) Payment-cost ratio: The payment-cost ratio is defined
as the total payment over the system cost in a batching
period. Here, the total payment is the sum of the
payments to intermediate nodes.
3) Setup time: The setup time of a routing request is the
period from when the request is sent to AP to when the
bandwidth allocation result is received by the sender.
A. Simulation Results
There are three sets of simulation results. The first set
demonstrates the system costs of different batching periods
and link cost functions for different values of the arrival
rate λ. Fig. 1 shows the system cost of different batching
periods with the link cost function of x2. The system costs
of all cases increase when the arrival rates of routing requests
increase. Since FABA equipped with a lower batching period
allocates the bandwidth and time slots more frequently, given
the same arrival rate, the total batched bandwidth requirements
of different senders to be satisfied at the end of the batching
period is relatively less than that of the FABA with a longer
batching period. As a result, FABA with lower batching period
results in a smaller system cost. The results in other cases with
different batching periods and link cost functions are similar.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of system costs for different batching periods.
The second set of simulation results examines the payment-
cost ratios of different batching periods and routing algorithms.
It is expected that the intermediate nodes can be cooperative
when the payment-cost ratio is smaller. The payment-cost
ratios of different algorithms and batching periods with the
link cost function of x2 are shown in Fig. 2. The payment-
cost ratios of different algorithms and batching periods grow
dramatically with the increase of arrival rate λ, because the
difference between W ′−u and W
a, which evaluates the reduc-
tion of system cost via the cooperation of Node u, becomes
larger with the increase of the cumulative bandwidth b. In
particular, FABA-δ with a larger batching period results in a
larger payment-cost ratio, since the cumulative bandwidth b
will be larger. In addition, SFA distributes the traffic more
uniformly into the network with a smaller δ resulting in a
smaller W ′−u in (11). As a result, given the batching period,
the payment-cost ratio becomes larger with the increase of δ
in FABA. Similar trends have been observed for other cases
of different link cost functions.
Our batching mechanism delays the unsatisfied requests to
the next batching period until the requests are satisfied. As
a result, the blocking probabilities of our proposed batching
algorithms are zero. However, the requests may need to wait
until the next batching period with a certain setup time. The
third set of simulation results shows the setup times of our
proposed batching algorithms for different arrival rates. Fig.
3 illustrates the setup time among the cases of different BPs.
Generally, the setup time is about half of the batching period,
when the arrival rate is small. There is a sharp jump when the
arrival rate increases from 110 min−1 to 120 min−1, since the
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Fig. 2. Comparison of payment-cost ratios for different algorithms.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of setup time for different algorithms.
scheduling of time slots in a batching period cannot support
all batched bandwidth requirements and, hence, more routing
requests are delayed. Furthermore, a setup time not more
than five seconds is acceptable to certain data transmission
applications in wireless networks [6].
Finally, we can summarize the relationships among batching
period, system cost, payment-cost ratio, setup time, and δ in
FABA. A longer batching period results in a larger system
cost, payment-cost ratio, and setup time. Moreover, smaller
δ results in a smaller payment-cost ratio but increases the
computational complexity. We expect both batching period and
δ to be small. However, a batching period and δ are selected so
that the payment calculation by SFA-δ can be finished within
a batching period.
V. CONCLUSION
We have constructed an analytical model of bandwidth allo-
cation and scheduling in a non-cooperative wireless network.
Traditional VCG cannot be applied in bandwidth allocation
and scheduling because of its high computational complexity.
Based on fast VCG auction, FABA, which still guarantees
strategy-proofness and efficiency, dramatically reduces the
computational time with only a small sacrifice in the payment-
cost ratio. The distributed version of FABA can be devised
so as to further improve the scalability of the allocation
mechanism.
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